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Abstract 
Landholders are generally assumed to be willing to participate in payments for ecosystem service 
(PES) schemes if the offered payment exceeds the opportunity cost of participation. The calculation of 
opportunity costs is often based on historic financial data such as net returns of the formerly practiced 
land use. Reliable estimates of opportunity costs are required especially in flexible, cost-aligned 
payment schemes with differentiated payments at the farm scale. We question whether opportunity 
cost estimates that do not consider personal landholder characteristics such as risk considerations, 
information access and non-monetary personal preferences (e.g. for traditional land use practices) are 
sufficient to explain a landholder„s decision to enrol land in PES. To test these assumptions, a PES 
adoption model was developed for hypothetical adoption decisions by 178 landholders in Costa Rica. 
The model explained up to 73.5% (Nagelkerkes pseudo R
2) of adoption variance. The results confirm 
that adoption is not determined by financial costs alone. Trust in state institutions, for example, was 
highly significant. The results call for more integrated methods of opportunity cost estimation such as 
inverse auctions. Their strength lies, among others, in that all adoption determinants are potentially 
expressed in the landholder„s bid. 
 
1  Introduction 
Landholders are generally assumed to be willing to participate in payments for ecosystem service 
(PES) schemes if the offered per hectare payment (Cpayment) exceeds their participation cost (Ci), i.e. 
the sum of their per hectare opportunity (Copp), conservation (Cc) and transaction costs (Ct). Following 
the definitions used in Wünscher et al. (2008), opportunity costs refer to the difference in income 
between the most profitable land use (before PES) and land retirement. Protection costs include all 
active protection efforts (e.g. firebreaks) and the landholders' transaction costs are all residual PES-
related  landholder  expenses  for  contract  establishment  and  maintenance  (e.g.  travel  expenses  and 
information gathering). The sum of these three cost elements is defined here as the participation cost. 
The calculation of opportunity costs is often based on historic financial data such as net returns of the 
formerly practiced land use. Reliable estimates of opportunity costs are required especially in flexible, 
cost-aligned  payment  schemes  with  differentiated  payments  at  the  farm  scale.  In  this  paper  we 
question the assumption that historic opportunity cost estimates fully represent all relevant opportunity 
costs. Rather, a landholder‟s opportunity cost is the expected future net return Bexp which depends on 
returns in the past (Copp), perceived risk and risk behavior (R) and the ability to access and process 
information (I). Also, it is possible that non-monetary costs and benefits (N) influence the landholder‟s 
opportunity cost and adoption decision. For example, professional pride or tradition may increase the 
perceived personal cost of land retirement. The sum of monetary and non-monetary values can be 
expressed in utilities. The utility of the agricultural land use option (Ua) could then be expressed in: 
Ua = Ua (Bexp, Na)                    (1) 
where Bexp is a function of past returns (Copp), risk perceptions and behavior (R) and information (I): 
Bexp = Bexp(Copp, R, I)                    (2) 
and Na are the non-monetary costs and benefits of the agricultural land use option. Synonymously, 
forest conservation through PES enrollment has a utility (Uc) which depends on the expected net 
payment (Pexp) and non-monetary values of forest conservation (Nc): 
Uc = Uc (Pexp,Nc)                    (3) 
where Pexp is a function of the offered payment (Cpayment), expected transaction and protection costs 
(Ct+p), perceived risk and risk behavior (R) as well as the ability to access and process information (I): 
Pexp = Pexp(Cpayment, Ct+p, R, I)                  (4) Mistrust towards state-run programs may, for example, increase the perceived risk that the payment 
(Cpayment) will not be made. The non-monetary benefit from PES participation (Nc) can, for example, be 
higher if a landholder has a general sympathy towards nature conservation. The decision to enroll land 
in the PES program would then not depend on a comparison of Cpayment and Ci but rather on the utilities 
Ua and Uc: 
γi = 1   if  Ua < Uc ;    γi = 0 otherwise             (5) 
where γi  {0,1} is an indicator variable reflecting participation.  
While it is difficult to monetarily value risk considerations, information and personal preferences, it is 
attempted here to study variables that are known or expected to have an influence on these criteria and 
thus on the landholder‟s enrolment decision. For example, the perceived risk from implementing a 
new technology or land use, here the production of environmental services through PES, has been 
shown to increase with age. The access to information may depend on the distance to commercial 
centers and on-farm infrastructure; and the ability to interpret and utilize such information can depend 
on the educational level. The objective is to analyze whether factors other than monetary flows in the 
past influence enrolment decisions given a flat per hectare payment. These factors have been known 
and  analyzed  for  many  years  in  so  called  “adoption”  studies  for  newly  developed  agricultural 
technologies  (e.g.  Albrecht  1969,  Mössner  1958,  Rogers  1962,  von  Platen  1985,  Gabersek  1990, 
Zbinden and Lee 2005). Instead of calculating Ua and Uc to determine γi, adoption studies seek to 
explain the adoption (γi = 1) of a new technology (here production of ES) with explanatory variables 
that also influence the values of Ua and Uc. In the adoption analysis presented here, participation cost 
is one of the variables that are examined, together with a number of other variables which are believed 
to proxy participation costs, risk considerations, information and individual preferences. The paper 
continues in section 2 with an overview of factors known in adoption theory to influence adoption, 
then lays out the methodology used for the analysis (section 3), subsequently presents and discusses 
the results (section 4) and concludes with final comments in section (5). 
2  Adoption Theory 
Adoption can be defined as the taking-over of an innovation by an individual or another “taking-over 
unit” (Albrecht 1969).  Adoption research  has its  origin  in the  North  American  extension  service, 
which wanted to evaluate the success of its work by the rate of adoption of recommended innovations 
(Mössner 1958). Whether or not adoption takes place is influenced by characteristics of the innovation 
as well as by characteristics of the farmer himself and of the society which (s)he lives in. Here we 
focus on the characteristics of the landholder as potential drivers for the adoption of PES. Von Platen 
(1985) points out the crucial influence the following factors have on adoption: 
1. The economic situation: Poorer landholders are less likely to take a risk by trying “new things”, 
which could bring them into economic dependency (from creditors, middlemen, etc.) or could even, in 
the worst case, endanger their existence. Farm size has often been used as an indicator of the economic 
situation because it is easily quantifiable. Large farms tend to have higher absolute profits and can 
therefore more easily introduce capital intensive innovations. However, 33% of all studies of this kind 
(of 228 in total) came to the conclusion that farm size had no influence on the adoption of innovations. 
2. The level of education: The higher the educational standard, the higher is a landholders ability to 
identify problems and the more likely (s)he is to search for information and solutions beyond the 
traditional means. Rogers (1962) could prove a positive correlation between education and innovative 
readiness. 
3. The attitude of the society towards innovations: The more reserved a society is towards changes, 
the less a member of this society will dare to try innovations, because he will run the risk of being 
excluded from social life.  
4. The support (in the form of credit, technical assistance, etc.): The more support the government or 
other institutions dedicate to the introduction of an innovation and the more assistance the farmer 
receives in his decision making processes, the more likely the farmer is to adopt the innovation. 
5.  Social  participation  and  cosmopoliteness:  These  terms  refer  to  the  open-mindedness  of  a 
landholder.  Both  are  reflected  by  indicators  such  as  membership  in  farming  organizations  and  a generally positive attitude towards extension. The effect is better access to information exchange. A 
large number of studies found a positive correlation between social participation and the adoption of 
innovations. Rogers (1983) analyzed 174 publications with regard to cosmopoliteness and found that 
74% of these confirmed this correlation. 
6. Presence of key persons: If key persons (persons with a strong influence on the opinions of other 
farmers) adopt an innovation, the confidence of other farmers in the new technology rises and they are 
more  likely  to  adopt  it  themselves.  The  key  persons  are  not  necessarily  the  innovators  who  – 
sometimes – are not fully integrated into the society of the majority. 
7. Access to information: Adoption theory distinguishes the classes “interpersonal communication” 
and “mass media communication”. The presence of these communication forms can increase the flow 
of information. More information helps reduce the perception of risk and thus the adoption process is 
accelerated. Which of the two classes of communication has the stronger influence on adoption differs 
and may depend on the type of innovation and/or the individual situation and characteristics of a 
farmer. Mass media are often seen as an instrument to spread first general information among the 
potential adopter group. In contrast, interpersonal communication can respond to individual problems 
and questions. However, interpersonal communication holds the risk that that “second hand” and thus 
less precise information is passed on. 
8. Risk aversion: The less risk averse a farmer is the more likely he is to adopt a new technology. 
Individually perceived risk can be reduced by information supply. 
Gabersek (1990) makes clear that it is very difficult to generalize what determines adoption. The 
factors  influencing  adoption  differ  very  much  from  case  to  case.  In  this  sense,  Albrecht  (1969) 
admitted that the insight gained in one case can not be transferred to another. The motives, objectives 
and  opinions  of  farmers  may  vary  widely  from  situation  to  situation.  Moreover,  there  are  large 
discrepancies between verbally expressed opinions and actually realized behavior (Six 1975). 
3  Methodology and Variables 
A field survey was administered to 178 randomly selected landholders on the Nicoya Peninsula in the 
Northwest of Costa Rica. The Nicoya Peninsula has a long tradition of beef production and is the 
region with the largest extension of pasture land (375,400 ha) in Costa Rica (CORFORGA 2001). The 
survey‟s  objective  was  to  obtain  data  on  hypothetical  adoption  decisions  as  well  as  personal 
landholder and farm characteristics. The geographical locations of the farms were determined using a 
global positioning system (GPS) in order to complement the information with secondary spatial data 
such as soil quality and slope. Table 1 provides an overview of the variables that were derived from 
the survey including an explanation of their meaning and expected influence on adoption. Two crucial 
variables („PES adoption‟ and „ParticipationCosts‟) are discussed here in more detail outside Table 1. 
In  order  to  obtain  information  about  the  adoption  behavior  of  landholders,  the  Costa  Rican  PES 
program  in  its  valid  form  of  2005  with  respect  to  forest  conservation  (requirements,  obligations, 
payment levels, etc.) was described in detail to the 178 landholders. The PES program in Costa Rica 
pays a flat rate of around US$40 per hectare and year for the conservation of forest. It also pays for the 
establishment of timber plantations and agro-forestry but these were excluded from the description. In 
addition to the 2005 program conditions, the option to retire agricultural land and allow natural forest 
regrowth for the same per hectare payment of around US$40  was also described
1. Following the 
program description, the interviewees were asked whether under these conditions they would place 
part  of  their  land  in  the  PES  program.  Those  with  an  affirmative  answer  were  classified  as 
hypothetical adopters.  
Participation  costs inclu de  opportunity,  protection and transaction costs.  For  the calculation  of 
opportunity costs, „pastureland‟ is focused as the most likely alternative to natural forest. Natural 
forest itself is assumed to produce no commercial income. This is because timber sales from natural 
                                                       
1 This option was officially included in the PES program in 2006 with a payment of US$41/ha/year. forests are prohibited by law, unless a management plan has been certified by Costa Rican authorities, 
which in recent years has almost never occurred. Illegal timber transport is risky, and very few rule 
violations seem to occur in the study area. Data of this study‟s field survey also show that non-timber 
benefits  are  close  to  zero.  However,  gradual  land-use  change  towards  pastures  without  timber 
commercialization  is  somewhat  more  frequently  observed  in  the  Nicoya  Peninsula.  Thus,  the 
opportunity cost of maintaining forest is equal to the foregone optional net return from pastures. Micro 
level net returns of pastureland were calculated by subtracting from the sum of incoming monetary 
flows of a defined reference year (e.g. from sales of cattle, milk, cheese, hay or renting out farm land) 
the sum of outgoing monetary flows (e.g. through purchase of farm inputs such as fertilizer, seed, 
herbicide, machinery, petrol). This approach is here referred to as the „Flow‟ approach. 
The landowners‟ transaction costs are expenses for contract establishment and maintenance (e.g. travel 
expenses,  information  gathering,  and  external  monitoring).  On  the  Nicoya  Peninsula,  the  great 
majority  of  PES  applications  for  small  and  medium  sized  land  plots  (<100  ha)  is  processed  by 
intermediaries (J.A. Jiménez Fajardo, pers. comm., 2007), who handle all associated transactions such 
as  paper  work,  consultancy,  technical  study  and  supervision.  For  this  service,  the  intermediaries 
charge a maximum of 18% of the payment, i.e. 7.20US$/ha, which is used as an approximation for 
transaction costs. Applications for large land plots (>100 ha) are normally processed by private forest 
engineers who may offer lower per hectare prices. For these land plots a hypothetical transaction cost 
of 12% of the PES payment is used, i.e. 4.80US$/ha . 
Finally, protection costs relate to active forest-protection efforts and mainly consist of establishing 
firebreaks,  fencing  off  cattle  and  signposting  the  areas  under  PES  contracts.  Protection  costs  are 
estimated for every plot individually based on the survey data. Firebreak costs were taken directly 
from survey data. Fencing costs were calculated multiplying per ha fencing costs for pasture with the 
factor 0.1818. Sign posts were estimated at 5 US$ for every 50 hectares. The mean protection cost is 
3.56 US$/ha/yr (Min 0.11, Max 23.07, S.D. 3.66). 
Two Logit models were constructed to examine the explanatory effect of the variables in Table 1 on 
the hypothetical adoption decision. The variables for the model are selected with the use of a backward 
elimination  procedure.  Since  logistic  models  do  not  necessarily  require  normal  distribution  of 
determinants, transformations are refrained from.  
Table 1  Variables with an expected explanatory effect on adoption  
Dependent 
Variable 
Meaning (expected effect in brackets)  Type  Exp. 
sign 
PES Adoption  Hypothetical acceptance of a PES contract under the conditions of 
the Costa Rican PES program as of 2005. 1 = Yes, I would include 
part of my land in the program. 0 = No, I would not include part of 
my land in the program.  
binomial   
Independent 
Variables 
Meaning (Hypothesized effect)  type   
Variables which proxy costs of participation     
ParticipationCosts  Sum of opportunity, transaction and conservation costs. Opportunity 
costs  according  to  Flow  approach.  (Higher  costs  are  expected  to 
decrease adoption probability). 
metric  (-) 
PriceIndex  Index for product prices in %. Constructed from own survey data on 
product prices. Sample average is 100%. (Higher prices, i.e. higher 
index values, are expected to increase opportunity costs and hence 
decrease adoption probability.) 
metric  (-) 
FactorIndex  Index for factor costs in %. Constructed from own survey data on 
factor  costs.  Sample  average  is  100%.  (Higher  factor  prices,  i.e. 
higher index values are expected to decrease opportunity costs and 
hence increase adoption probability.) 
metric  (+) 
DistAuction  Distance  in  kilometers  to  nearest  cattle  auction  center.  Distance 
measured  “as  the  crow  flies”.  (Longer  distance  is  expected  to 
increase product transport costs, thus decrease opportunity costs and 
hence increase adoption probability.) 
metric  (+) 
DistCommerce  Distance  in  kilometers  to  nearest  commercial  center.  Distance 
measured  “as  the  crow  flies”.  (Longer  distance  is  expected  to 
metric  (+) increase transport costs, thus decrease opportunity costs and hence 
increase adoption probability.) 
Slope  Average  slope  of  land  in  %.  (Steeper  slopes  reduce  production 
capacity  and  are  thus  expected  to  decrease  opportunity  costs  and 
increase adoption probability.) 
metric  (+) 
Altitude  Altitude in meters above sea level. (Higher elevations with moderate 
temperatures  favor  agricultural  production  and  thus  increase 
opportunity costs decreasing adoption probability.) 
metric  (-) 
Capacity  Soil  use  capacity  for  agricultural  production.  Six  categories  with 
decreasing quality from II (best) to VIII (worst) transformed to five 
dummies  with  category  II  used  as  reference  category.  Categories 
from II upwards are expected to decrease opportunity costs and thus 
increase adoption probability.) 
binomial  (+) 
FamilyWork  Family members work in farming activities (1) or they do not (0). 
(Availability  of  family  labor  is  expected  to  increase  opportunity 
costs and thus decrease PES adoption probabilities.) 
binomial  (-) 
ProductionFocus  Main production focus: 0=principally meat, 1=milk and meat, (zero 
farms  produced  principally  milk).  Milk  production  is  generally  a 
more profitable agricultural activity. Therefore the joint production 
of „milk and meat‟ is expected to increase opportunity costs and thus 
decrease adoption probabilities.) 
binomial  (-) 
FireBreaks  Fire breaks were given maintenance in 2004 (1) or they were not (0). 
(Costa Rica‟s PSA program requires fire breaks. If fire breaks are 
already maintained they are not perceived to be an additional cost. 
Adoption probability is therefore expected to increase with 1) 
binomial  (+) 
Canton  Canton in which land parcel is located (canton is an administrative 
unit that is smaller than the province but larger than municipality and 
district). Five dummies for six cantons. Canton Carrillo is reference 
canton.  (The  other  cantons  of  the  study  area,  namely  Hojancha, 
Nandayure, Nicoya, Puntarenas, Santa Cruz, are expected to have 
lower per hectare returns than Carrillo and therefore higher adoption 
probabilities. 
binomial  (+) 
Variables which primarily measure or proxy risk considerations     
Area  Size of land property in hectares. Property size is expected to have 
contrary  effects:  (1a)  A  large  property  allows  the  land  owner  to 
„experiment‟  with  the  new  land-use  on  small  parcels  without 
significant  risk  to  the  overall  enterprise,  thus  increasing  adoption 
probability. (1b) Area proxies the overall economic situation. The 
risk of adoption decreases with the economic situation (failure can 
more easily be buffered) and increases the probability of adoption. 
(1c)  A  large  property  also  decreases  transaction  costs  and  thus 
increases  adoption  probability.  (2)  Economies  of  scale  (and  thus 
opportunity  costs)  increase  with  property  size,  hence  decreasing 
adoption probability.  
metric  (+/-) 
Consumption  Household  consumption.  Four  categories  for  low  (1)  to  high 
consumption (4) represented by three dummies. Category 1 is used 
as reference category. (Household consumption is assumed to proxy 
the economic situation of the landowner. It is expected that the risk 
of adoption decreases with the economic situation (failure can more 
easily be buffered) and increases the probability of adoption. 
binomial  (+) 
Off-farmIncome  Existence  of  off-farm  income:  1=yes,  0=no.  (Off-farm  income 
decreases dependence on farm production and thus  willingness to 
take risks with new land use technologies such as PES. As a result, 
adoption probability increases with off-farm income.) 
binomial  (+) 
%FarmIncome  Percentage of income that is generated on-farm. (The expectation for 
this  variable  follows  the  argumentation  of  the  variable  „Off-
farmIncome‟. The risk of adopting new land-use technologies (here 
PES)  increases  with  on-farm  income,  hence  decreasing  adoption 
probability.) 
metric  (-) 
Forest  Existence of forest on land property: 1=yes, 0=no. The existence of 
forest enables the landowner to adopt PES as an „additive‟ land use 
as opposed to a „substitutive‟ land use in the presence of pasture 
binomial  (+) only.  Introducing  the  new  technology,  here  PES,  as  an  „additive‟ 
component reduces the risk and thus increases adoption probability. 
%Forest  Percentage of total property area with forest. (This variable is similar 
to the previous („Forest‟), yet instead of indicating only the existence 
of forest it measures its proportion. Higher percentages increase the 
possibility  of  „additive‟  technology  adoption,  here  PES,  which 
decreases risk and thus increases adoption probability. 
metric  (+) 
HouseholdSize  Number of household members. (This variable is expected to have 
two complementary effects on adoption:  Household size increases 
vulnerability  and  thus  the  risk  aversion  of  the  landowner.  Hence, 
adoption  probability  decreases.  (ii)  Household  size  increases  the 
availability of  family labor increasing opportunity costs,  and thus 
decreasing adoption probability.) 
count  (-) 
Trust  Degree  of  trust  in  state-run  programs.  Three  variables  low  (1), 
medium (2) and high degree of trust (3) transformed to two dummies 
variables  with  category  (1)  as  reference.  Higher  degrees  of  trust 
decrease the perceived risk of adoption and thus increase adoption 
probability. 
binomial  (+) 
ProfitExpectations  Land owner‟s expected profit trends. Returns will go down (1), stay 
the  same  or  will  go  up  (0). (Expectations  for  returns  to  decrease 
would  increase  the  attractiveness  of  PES  and  its  adoption 
probability.) 
binomial  (+) 
RiskBehavior  Risk  behavior.  Interviewees  were  asked  to  choose  between  three 
business opportunities  with different levels of risk. Depending on 
their choice interviewees were classified as risk-averse (1) or other 
(0).  Risk-averse  landholders  are  less  likely  to  adopt  a  new 
technology, hence adoption probability is expected to decrease. 
binomial  (-) 
Age  Age of land owner. (In general older landholders are expected to be 
more risk averse or conservative decreasing the adoption probability 
of PES). 
metric  (-) 
Variables which proxy ability to access and process information     
EducationalLevel  Educational level of farm owner. Five categories from „never went 
to  school‟  (0)  to  „Higher  education‟  (4).  Reference  Dummy  is 
category 1. (Higher educational levels are expected to increase the 
ability  to  access  and  process  information  which  decreases 
uncertainties  and  hence  the  perceived  risk  of  adoption.  Adoption 
probability is expected to increase with education.) 
binomial  (+/-) 
DistInfoCenters  Distance in kilometers from land property to four „PES information 
centers‟ which are: Agricultural Cantonal Centers (i) Hojancha, (ii) 
Nandayure, (iii) Puntarenas and (iv) non-governmental organization 
Fundecongo. Increasing distance inhibits access to information on 
PES  which  increases  the  perceived  risk  of  participation  and  thus 
decreases adoption probability. 
  (-) 
Road  Type and quality of road leading to property. Categories from 1 to 5 
with decreasing quality, transformed to four dummies with reference 
category 1. (Road type is expected to have two contrary effects: (i) 
Decreasing road quality reduces the access to information on PES 
and  thus  increases  the  perceived  risk,  hence  decreasing  adoption 
probability. (ii) Decreasing road quality increases transport costs and 
thus decreases opportunity costs increasing adoption probability.) 
binomial  (+/-) 
Accessibility  All year accessibility of property with 4x2 automobile. 1=yes, 0=no. 
(This variable is simplified version of the previous variable „Road‟ 
and thus is also expected to have two contrary effects: (i) All year 
accessibility improves the access to information about PES and thus 
decreases the perceived risk, hence increasing adoption probability. 
(ii) All year accessibility decreases transport costs and thus increases 
opportunity costs, decreasing adoption probability.) 
binomial  (+/-) 
Variables which proxy perceived non-monetary costs/benefits     
Conscience  State of conscience in the hypothetical situation of having cut down 
a tree: 1=bad conscience, 0=other. (Adoption probability is expected 
to  be  higher  among  those  with  a  „bad  conscience‟  because  their 
perceived personal benefit from cutting a tree is lower than for those 
binomial  (+) who do not have a bad conscience). 
FearDenounce  Fear  to  be  reported  to  the  police  in  the  hypothetical  situation  of 
having cut down a tree: 1=fear, 0=other.  (Adoption probability is 
expected to be higher among those who fear to be reported to the 
police because their perceived personal benefit from cutting a tree is 
lower than for those who do not fear to be reported). 
binomial  (+) 
FearReputation  Fear  that  one‟s  social  reputation  could  suffer  in  the  hypothetical 
situation  of  having  cut  down  a  tree:  1=fear,  0=other.  (Adoption 
probability is expected to be higher among those who fear to lose 
social  reputation  because  their  perceived  personal  benefit  from 
cutting  a  tree  is  lower  than  for  those  who  do  not  fear  to  lose 
reputation).  
binomial  (+) 
Other variables     
NumberLandlords  Number of property owners. (It is expected that a higher number of 
owners decreases PES adoption probabilities because among a larger 
group of decision makers it is more difficult to come to an agreement 
for land-use change.) 
count  (-) 
 
4  Results 
Among the 178 interviewees 45 (25.3%) were classified as hypothetical adopters and 133 (74.7%) as 
hypothetical non-adopters.  In section 4.1, a binary logistic regression model (Adoption Model) is 
constructed to measure the explanatory effect of proxies for participation costs, risk, information and 
non-monetary considerations on adoption. With the intention to simplify the model, a second model 
(Reduced Adoption Model) is developed in section 4.2 by manually selecting the most significant 
variables that explain the largest part of adoption variance. Since participation costs did not turn out to 
be  a  significant  determinant  of  adoption  in  neither  of  the  two  models,  a  descriptive  analysis  of 
adoption  decision  and  participation  costs  follows  in  section  Fehler!  Verweisquelle  konnte  nicht 
gefunden werden.. 
4.1  Adoption Model 
The „Adoption Model‟ is presented in Table 2. Beside the constant, the model is comprised of a total 
of 21 variables, of which eight are metric, one is a count and twelve are binomial variables. Of the 
twelve binomial variables, six are dummy transformed categories of multinomial variables. Thirteen 
variables plus the constant are significant and the model explains 50% (Cox&Snell pseudo R
2) to 74% 
(Nagelkerkes pseudo R
2) of the variance of the dependent variable. 
Table 2  The Adoption Model 
Dependent Var.  N  Log-Likelihood  Cox&Snell R
2  Nagelkerkes R
2 
Adoption (1;0)  178  70.364  0.496  0.735 
               
Independent Var.  Coeff.B  S.E.  Wald  df  Sig.  Exp(B)  Simple
a 
ParticipationCosts  0.006  0.003  3.500  1  0.061  1.006  *.04(+); .03/.04 
PriceIndex  -0.030  0.014  4.322  1  *0.038  0.970  .71(+); .00/.00 
DistCommerce  -0.083  0.042  3.895  1  *0.048  0.921  .59(+); .00/.00 
Slope  1.149  0.452  6.465  1  *0.011  3.156  *.00(+); .06/.09 
ProductionFocus  -1.983  1.111  3.187  1  0.074  0.138  .50(+); .00/.00 
Canton(Hojancha)  -7.651  2.748  7.754  1  *0.005  0.000  .09(-); .03/.04 
Canton(Nicoya)  2.310  0.938  6.066  1  *0.014  10.078  .17(+); .01/.02 
Area  0.022  0.007  10.491  1  *0.001  1.022  *.00(+); .12/.18 
Consumption(2)  -1.659  0.872  3.617  1  0.057  0.190  .06(-); .02/.03 
Consumption(4)  -2.622  1.435  3.339  1  0.068  0.073  .92(+); .00/.00 
Road(4)  -3.049  1.310  5.420  1  *0.020  0.047  .54(+); .00/.00 
Off-FarmIncome  -3.247  1.867  3.022  1  0.082  0.039  *.02(-); .03/.05 %FarmIncome  -0.045  0.026  2.985  1  0.084  0.956  .08(+); .02/.03 
Forest  2.943  1.496  3.869  1  *0.049  18.974  *.00(+); .12/.18 
%Forest  0.038  0.020  3.724  1  *0.054  1.039  *.00(+); .16/.23 
Trust(3)  3.509  1.107  10.043  1  *0.002  33.415  *.00(+); .06/.09 
RiskBehavior  -2.761  1.057  6.821  1  *0.009  0.063  .14(-); .01/.02 
Age  -0.066  0.032  4.196  1  *0.041  0.936  *.04(-); .03/.04 
Conscience  1.382  0.792  3.043  1  0.081  3.983  .08(+); .02/.03 
FearDenounce  -1.791  0.966  3.434  1  0.064  0.167  .78(-); .00/.00 
NumberLandlords  -1.028  0.356  8.367  1  *0.004  0.358  .12(-); .02/.02 
Constant  8.129  4.225  3.703  1  *0.054  3391.241  n.a. 
a  This  column  depicts  the  significance  of  the  variable  in  a  simple  logistic  model  containing  the  variable  as  the  only 
determinant. If the variable is significant this is depicted with an asterisk before the p-value which is followed in brackets by 
the sign of the coefficient in the simple regression. After the apostrophe follow the two pseudo R-square values Cox&Snell 
and Nagelkerkes, respectively. 
 
Of  the  thirteen  significant  variables  five  are  proxies  for  participation  costs  (PriceIndex, 
DistCommerce,  Slope,  CantonHojancha,  CantonNicoya).  Six  belong  to  the  group  of  risk  proxies 
(Area, Forest, %Forest, Trust3, RiskBehavior, Age), one belongs to the group of information proxies 
(Road4), and one belongs to the group of other proxies (NumberLandlords). The results clearly show 
that  adoption  is  not  determined  by  participation  costs  (as  measured  here)  alone.  Non-monetary 
personal values could not be shown to play a significant role in adoption (the model does not contain a 
significant  variable  from  that  group).  Below  follows  a  brief  discussion  of  the  thirteen  significant 
variables as well as the insignificant variable „ParticipationCosts‟: 
The variable „PriceIndex‟ has, as expected, a negative coefficient and shows that adoption probability 
decreases as product prices increase. 
„DistCommerce‟ was expected to have a positive sign because of its negative impact on opportunity 
costs. Yet, in the model the sign is negative. It is possible that DistCommerce has also other effects. 
For  example,  distance  to  commercial  centers  might  proxy  access  to  PES  information  (like 
DistInfoCenters).  It  is  possible  that  information  exchange  with  colleagues  at  commercial  centers 
(interpersonal  communication)  have  more  significant  impacts  on  the  adoption  decision  than 
information  from  the  so  called  „Information  Centers‟.  The  likeliness  to  obtain  such  information 
decreases with the distance to commercial centers, negatively impacting adoption. 
The variable „Slope‟ shows that adoption probability significantly increases with slope. Steep areas are 
less favorable for conventional agricultural production and therefore more apt to produce ES. Note, the 
measure is an average for the entire property while the adoption decision is likely only based on the 
most marginal and least productive areas within a farm, here those with the steepest gradients. In the 
case of slope the farm average turns out to be sufficient in explaining part of the adoption variation.  
The two dummy variables Canton(Hojancha) and Canton(Nicoya) are both significant, the first with a 
negative coefficient, the second with a positive coefficient. Both were expected to bear positive signs 
due to lower average per hectare returns in Hojancha and Nicoya compared to those in Carrillo. But 
the cantons bundle several characteristics (not only per hectare returns) that can potentially influence 
adoption and as a whole produce an observed aggregate effect. Canton(Hojancha), for example, is 
significantly correlated to thirteen variables in the model, and Canton(Nicoya) is correlated to seven 
variables. 
The variable „Area‟ explains a large percentage of variance in the simple logit model (Pseudo R
2s: 
Cox&Snell  12%;  Nagelkerkes  18%).  With  every  additional  hectare  of  land  the  marginal  odds  of 
adoption increase by 2.2% (Exp(B)=1.022) in the Adoption Model. The variable clearly shows that 
PES participation depends on the availability of land. As was already stated in Table 1, large land 
properties allow the landowners to experiment with new land-uses such as PES on smaller parcels 
without significantly impacting the current production system and without taking major risks in case 
of failure. Large properties also enable the landowner to enroll larger areas reducing transaction costs 
and  thus  increasing  the  attractiveness  of  adoption.  Farm  size  also  proxies  the  overall  economic 
situation of a farmer which decreases the risks of adoption in case of failure. It is also likely that the owner of much land is underutilizing marginal and less favorable parts of the terrain. Their inclusion 
in a PES program therefore hurts less than the inclusion of highly utilized parts. PES might tip the 
scales in determining the land use on such marginal areas switching from underutilized agricultural 
use to forest conservation under PES. Given the results these effects clearly overrule the hypothesized 
effect that economies of scale may increase per hectare returns and thus make adoption less likely. 
The existence of forest („Forest‟) drastically increases adoption probability as the odds of adoption are 
almost  nineteen  times  higher  (Exp(B)=18.97)  for  someone  with  forest  than  for  someone  without. 
Among all variables though, „%Forest‟ (proportion of forest on total land area) explains the largest 
part of adoption variance in a simple logistic regression (Pseudo R
2s: Cox&Snell 16%; Nagelkerkes 
23%). Its significance makes a strong statement about what type of land use is particularly interesting 
for landowners to enroll in PES. With every additional percent of forest on the total land area, the odds 
of adoption increase by 3.9% (Exp(B)=1.039) in the Adoption Model. This indicates that landowners 
predominantly include forest in the program. Descriptive data confirm this observation: the majority of 
the 3,823 ha which landowners said to be willing to enroll in PES consisted of forest (2,353 ha or 
61.5%), land already under a PES contract at the time of the interview 629 ha (16.5%) and pasture 
fallow, so called „Tacotales‟ or „Charrales‟ (511 ha or 13.4%). Only 324 ha (8.5%) were pastures and 
6 ha (0.2%) plantations. 
If „Trust(3)‟ takes the value of one an interviewee highly trusts state-run programs. In a simple logistic 
model this variable explains 6% (Cox&Snell R
2) to 9% (Nagelkerkes R
2) of adoption variance. A high 
level of trust boosts the odds of adoption by about 33 times (Exp(B)= 33.415) in the Adoption Model. 
The  descriptive  results  confirm  this  finding  and  show  that  the  hypothetical  adoption  rate  among 
landowners with a high degree of trust (48.6%) is considerably higher than the adoption rate among 
land owners with lower degrees of trust (18.8%). 
As expected, the variable „RiskBehavior‟ shows that risk-averse landholders are less likely to adopt 
PES than others. According to the Adoption Model, the odds of adoption for risk-averse landholders 
are 93.7% lower (Exp(B)=0.067). 
„Age‟ is negatively correlated with adoption. In the Adoption Model the odds of adoption decrease by 
6.4%  with  every  year  of  age  (Exp(B)=0.936)  and  thus  confirm  the  expectation  that,  with  age, 
landholders become  more conservative and risk-averse, both impediments to the adoption of new 
technologies.  
The variable „Road(4)‟ bears, as expected, a negative sign indicating that access to information is more 
difficult along bad roads. Less information increases the perceived risk of adoption and thus decreases 
adoption probability. Also, a poor road imposes higher transaction costs on the landowner as (s)he 
seeks to obtain information on PES. 
The  negative  coefficient  for  „NumberLandlords‟  shows  that  adoption  probability  decreases 
significantly (p=0.004) with the number of landlords of a property. Decision making processes may 
become  more  complex  and  difficult  with  a  growing  number  of  landowners.  Although  daily 
management is mostly in the hand of only one of the owners, fundamental decisions have to be made 
among all. Descriptive data supports this interpretation: Some hypothetical non-adopters stated that 
participation in the PES program had to be decided by the family. 
„ParticipationCosts‟ turned out to be in the model but not among the significant variables. This could 
be due to suppressor effects  by other proxies for participation costs (e.g. PriceIndex, Slope).  But 
although „ParticipationCosts‟ is significant in a simple regression (see column „Simple‟), it bears an 
unexpected  positive  sign  which  suggests  problems  with  the  computed  estimates  for 
„ParticipationCosts‟.  The  quality  of  the  cost  estimates  was  already  questioned  in  section  Fehler! 
Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. but plausibility tests could not confirm these doubts. 
Standard measures to prevent survey errors had also been taken. For example, the plausibility of 
individual interviewee responses was controlled by cross-checking answers throughout the related 
questionnaires. Transfer errors from paper into digital format were minimized by comparing the final 
digital data sheet with the original questionnaires. 
It is possible that participation costs are significant for specific groups in the sample: For example, 
landholders who do not trust state-run programs do not adopt independent of their participation costs while  those  with  trust  base  their  adoption  decision  on  costs.  The  validity  of  this  and  similar 
assumptions was tested by using interaction terms multiplying „ParticipationCosts‟ with variables like 
„Trust‟,  „ProductionFocus‟,  „Accessibility‟,  „Off-FarmIncome‟,  „Forest‟,  „RiskBehavior‟, 
„Conscience‟, „FearDenounce‟ and „FearReputation‟. Each variable was multiplied with three different 
estimates of participation costs derived from the Flow, Rent and Perception approaches giving a total 
of 27 interaction terms. Regressing adoption on the interaction terms, however, returned not a single 
significant relation. 
„ParticiaptionCosts‟ is, like other variables (e.g. „Slope‟), an average measure across all parcels of a 
farm. It is possible that this average is not sufficient to explain adoption. A landholder is likely to first 
enroll the most marginal and least productive land parcels of his property into the program. Average 
participation costs do not reflect the participation costs of the least productive areas and therefore may 
turn out to be insignificant in explaining adoption. 
Comparing the performance of a variable in the simple regression (see column „Simple‟) with its 
performance in the multiple regression can reveal information about a variable‟s explanatory strength 
and  relation  to  other  independent  variables.  For  example,  the  variables  „Slope‟,  „Area‟,  „Forest‟, 
„%Forest‟, „Trust‟ and „Age‟ belong to the variables which are significant in both the simple and 
multiple regressions. „ParticipationCosts‟ and „Off-FarmIncome‟, on the other hand, are significant in 
simple  regressions,  yet  lose  their  significance  in  the  multiple  model  due  to  influences  by  other 
variables:  „ParticipationCosts‟  is  positively  correlated  with  „ProductionFocus‟  (p<0.001)  and 
„%FarmIncome‟  (p=0.029);  „Off-FarmIncome‟  is  negatively  correlated  with  „ProductionFocus‟ 
(p=0.007), „Area‟ (0.009), „%FarmIncome‟ (p<0.001) and „Forest‟. A third group of variables benefit 
from mediator or moderator effects in the multiple regression where they are significant while they are 
not  in  the  simple  regression.  These  are  „PriceIndex‟,  „DistCommerce‟,  „Canton(Hojancha)‟, 
„Canton(Nicoya)‟, „Road(4)‟, „RiskBehavior‟ and „NumberLandlords‟. 
4.2  Reduced Adoption Model 
The variables that seem to contribute most to explaining variance are among the group of variables 
that are significant both in the simple and multiple regression. These are (i) „%Forest‟ which in the 
simple regression has pseudo R-squares of 16% (Cox&Snell) and 23% (Nagelkerkes), (ii) „Area‟ and 
(iii) „Forest‟ which both have pseudo R-squares of 12% (Cox&Snell) and 18% (Nagelkerkes), (iv) 
„Trust(3)‟ and (v) „Slope‟ both with 6% (Cox&Snell) and 9% (Nagelkerkes), and finally, (vi) „Age‟ 
(3% and 4%). If these six variables are used for a logistic regression applying a backward elimination 
process  with  likelihood  ratio,  „Slope‟  and  „Forest‟  are  excluded  and  a  model  results  (Reduced 
Adoption Model) with four highly significant variables and pseudo R-squares of 30.6% (Cox&Snell) 
and  45.2%  (Nagelkerkes)  (Table  3).  Forest  is  probably  excluded  from  this  model  because  of  its 
correlation with %Forest (p<0.001) and Area (p=0.032). Slope is probably excluded because of its 
correlation with %Forest (p<0.001). The other variables in the model are not significantly correlated 
with each other. 
Table 3  Reduced Adoption Model 
Dependent Var.  N  Log-Likelihood  Cox&Snell R
2  Nagelkerkes R
2 
Adoption (1;0)  178  138.383  0.306  0.452 
               
Independent Var.  Coeff.B  S.E.  Wald  df  Sig.  Exp(B)  Simple
a 
Area  0.010  0.003  9.152  1  0.002  1.011  *.00(+); .12/.18 
Age  -0.034  0.016  4.770  1  0.029  0.967  *.00(+); .03/.04 
%Forest  0.044  0.009  23.093  1  <0.001  1.045  *.00(+); .16/.23 
Trust(3)  2.122  0.527  16.220  1  <0.001  8.350  *.00(+); .06/.09 
Constant  -1.346  0.902  2.226  1  0.136  0.260  n.a. 
a  This  column  depicts  the  significance  of  the  variable  in  a  simple  logistic  model  containing  the  variable  as  the  only 
determinant. If the variable is significant this is depicted with an asterisk before the p-value which is followed in brackets by 
the sign of the coefficient in the simple regression. After the apostrophe follow the two pseudo R-square values Cox&Snell 
and Nagelkerkes, respectively.  
5  Summary and Conclusion  
The paper sets out by questioning whether participation costs that are calculated from monetary flows 
in the past are a sufficient measure to explain a landholder‟s decision to enroll land in PES. Expected 
future  costs  and  benefits were  instead  assumed  to  be  a  better  measure  which,  however,  involves 
considerations of risk and information in addition to monetary flows in the past. Moreover, non-
monetary values such as traditions were hypothesized to influence the landholder‟s decision. To test 
the  validity  of  these  assumptions  an  adoption  model  was  constructed  from  variables  that  proxy 
participation  cost,  risk,  information  and  non-monetary  values.  The  model  explained  up  to  73.5% 
(Nagelkerkes  R
2)  of  adoption  variance.  The  results  confirm  that  adoption  is  not  determined  by 
participation  costs  alone.  Risk  and  information  proxies  play  a  significant  role.  Non-monetary 
preferences, however, could not be shown to significantly explain adoption. The results are confirmed 
by some of the explanations that hypothetical non-adopters gave in the field survey for rejecting PES. 
Participation  costs  had  an  unexpected  positive  effect  on  adoption  when  used  as  a  proxy  for 
participation  costs  in  a  simple  adoption  model.  A  detailed  comparison  of  cost  estimates  with 
hypothetical adoption decisions could not dissolve this contradiction although a comparison with real 
adoption decisions tended to reveal less contradicting results. The study‟s main limitation that should 
be acknowledged is that adoption decisions are hypothetical. As Six (1975) pointed out, there can be 
large discrepancies between verbally expressed opinions and actually realized behavior. It is therefore 
possible that real adoption decisions are influenced more strongly by cost considerations than could be 
shown here. However, given the results at hand we conclude that approaches which derive estimates 
for participation costs from monetary flows in the past do not reliably determine the payment level that 
would be necessary to induce the landholders‟ PES participation. Other approaches are required to 
adequately consider risk factors, information access and possibly also personal preferences (which, 
however, could not be confirmed in this study). Inverse auction systems may be a potential alternative 
approach for the determination of farm level opportunity or participation costs. Their strength lies, 
among others, in that all adoption determinants (including risk, information and personal preferences) 
are potentially expressed in the landholder„s bid. 
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